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In this current era of diminishing physical and fiscal resources it is 
imperative that the U. S. military conduct its operations in an efficient manner. 
History has proven that victory is most often achieved by the force which can 
best manage strategy, tactics, and logistics.
Wars have been won or lost because of logistics. For many centuries, 
feeding the soldier was the primary logistical demand. More recently, the 
Industrial Revolution caused ammunition to become the principal supply 
concern. Modern military forces consume large amounts of petroleum products 
in support of combat operations and training. One U. S. Army division with 
16,000 personnel may require over 700,000 gallons of petroleum products each 
day.
The subject of this thesis research is military liquid logistics. Liquid 
logistics support involves forecasting, procurement, distribution, and storage of 
petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) as well as potable water. Army POL 
includes motor gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet propellants. The focus is on 
forecasting the POL requirements of U. S. Army units operating in different 
tactical environments and optimizing the transportation, distribution, and 
storage of bulk POL supply.
Tactical and logistical data is published by various Army agencies. Unit 
logisticians prepare fuel forecasts based exclusively on limited historical 
records and imprecise approximation methods. The reason is that the available 
published data is not coherent.
iii
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This research reveals that a relationship exists between Equipment 
Category Codes and Line Item Numbers. The discovery of this relationship 
affords both structure and coherence to large volumes of tactical and logistical 
data. A computer program is presented which uses this data to develop POL 
demand forecasts.
This thesis also provides the means to evaluate the constrained fuel 
resource problem once POL demands are available. The method presented can 
be used as a decision making tool to reduce costs and conserve valuable 
resources. It demonstrates that the optimal solutions to a myriad of POL 







ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  .......................................................................... vi
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................... 1
2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE................................................................ ,5
Food and the Foot Soldier............................................................................ 5
Steam and Ammunition..........................................................................7
Internal Combustion E ngine.................................................................... 8
3. STRUCTURE AND COHERENCE........................................................... 9
4. OPTIMIZATION........................................................................   12
Background................................................................................................  12
Validation.  .......................................................................................... 13
5. RECOMMENDATIONS.........................................................................  15
6. CONCLUSIONS........................................... 16
CITED REFERENCES......................................................................................  18
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................. 19
APPENDICES
A. HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM................................................................. 20
B. QUICK & DIRTY TRANSPORTATION METHOD............................ 33
C. LOGISTICS SUPPORT.............................................................................. 39
D. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION.....................................................................41
E. UNITS IN DATA BASE ........................................................................... 44




Of all the persons to whom I am indebted, I owe the most to my wife, 
Georgiann. She has been my primary source of encouragement, strength, and 
support.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. James W. Crafton for his 
mentorship. His constant guidance kept me both motivated and focused. He 
continued to believe in this project despite my occasional doubts.
I must also thank Dr. Ramona M. Graves for her wise counsel, inspiration, 
and understanding. I owe special thanks to Professor Robert S. Thompson and 
Colonel (Ret.) Warren A. Spaulding for their helpful suggestions. I will remain 
indebted to Dr. Robert E. D. Woolsey for teaching me many "quick and dirty" 
solution methods for practical problems.
Final words of gratitude are due to the United States Army for affording me 
the opportunity to attend graduate school and to the Colorado School of Mines 





The mission of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) is to ensure 
an adequate supply of domestic energy at acceptable costs and environmental 
impacts. In 1986, the DOE Secretary asked the Energy Research Advisory 
Board (ERAB) to identify and report the nation's geoscience research needs 
relative to the DOE mission. The ERAB report highlighted the rapidly declining 
rate of domestic oil production and the depletion of known reserves. The report 
also stated:
The major energy problem facing the United States is a 
shortage of domestic liquid hydrocarbons, which threatens 
the nation's long-term energy security and international 
competitiveness. 1
The shortage of domestic liquid hydrocarbons could also have a direct 
impact on the ability of the United States Army to conduct its mission of 
national defense. Modern ground and air forces are very mobile, therefore fuel 
intensive. Their fuel demands can only be satisfied by liquid hydrocarbon 
energy sources.
A single Army division with 16,000 assigned personnel may have daily 
liquid hydrocarbon fuel demands in excess o f 700,000 gallons. The Army 
currently has 764,000 active soldiers and 18 divisions. In addition, 776,000 
soldiers and 10 divisions constitute the Army R e se rv e s .2 In the event of conflict, 
the domestic ability to produce liquid hydrocarbon fuels may be critical for 
military success.
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In this age of diminishing physical and fiscal domestic resources, it is 
imperative that the U. S. Army conduct its operations in an efficient manner. 
History has shown that victory is most often achieved by the force which can 
best manage strategy, tactics, and logistics.
The subject of this thesis research is military liquid logistics. Liquid 
logistics support involves forecasting, procurement, distribution, and storage of 
petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) as well as potable water. Army POL 
includes motor gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet propellants. The thesis focus is on 
forecasting the POL requirements of U. S. Army units operating in different 
environments and optimizing the transportation, distribution, and storage of 
bulk POL supply.
The word logistics stems from the Greek "logistikos" which means "skilled 
in c a lc u la t in g " .  ̂ Logisticians have been calculating answers to the same 
questions throughout history. What do we need? When do we need it? Where 
can we get it? How should we transport, distribute, and store it? Most 
logisticians learn from experience that the answers to these questions are not 
easily determined or necessarily obvious. They also realize that finding the 
near optimal answers is the key to victory.
The thesis objective is to develop a method which logisticians could use to 
calculate the optimal solutions for POL transportation, distribution, and storage 
problems. The initial research effort therefore focused on the study of operations 
research and linear programming techniques.
Dr. E. D. Woolsey is a proponent of a "quick and dirty" method for 
transportation problems which uses matrices and a relatively simple iterative 
solution technique.^ The method's procedure is outlined in Appendix B. This 
very practical technique is used in this thesis for POL resource optimization.
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If one can identify costs, supply, and demand, then an optimal solution for 
the associated transportation problem can be found. Logisticians are often able 
to express POL costs by variables such as time, distance, or volume. The bulk 
supply of POL is based on demand forecasts developed by the consuming unit's 
logistician. The entire POL logistics system is dependent on the quality of these 
forecasts.
The consuming unit's logistician must prepare fuel forecasts based 
exclusively on limited historical data and imprecise approximation methods. 
Army FM 100-5, the guide for Army tactical doctrine, directs the logistician to 
develop fuel forecasts based on "experience and planning data".® The planning 
data referenced appears in FM 100-10-1 and consists of several generic 
approximation methods.® The logistician is encouraged by FM 100-5 to 
"consider special factors"®, which include terrain and weather, but is not 
provided definitive guidance.
The consuming unit is, by definition, the battalion or company level. This 
unit's logistician is also at the entry level of professional logistics. He (or she) 
has a small staff and few technical resources at his disposal. He must daily 
satisfy a myriad of supply demands. The units which depend on him for their 
POL support expect and often require instan t supply gratification. 
Commanders are of necessity very unforgiving of any logistical shortfalls. The 
dynamic nature of the battlefield does not often afford time to conduct extensive 
research or detailed calculations.
The thesis objective is achieved in two steps. The first step is to provide a tool 
which logisticians may use to forecast fuel demands more accurately. This step 
involves providing coherence to the large volume of data contained in FM 100-10- 
1, FM 100-5, and SB 710-2.? Unit organizational structures, equipment
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authorizations, fuel consumption rates, tactical operating conditions, and 
geographical data are compiled into a data base. A menu driven computer 
program enables the user to access the data and compute fuel demands for 
Army units under a wide variety of battlefield conditions.
The second step is to address the problem of bulk POL resource optimization. 
This thesis demonstrates that many apparently complex POL transportation, 
distribution, and storage problems are tractable. Optimal solutions can be 
determined by very practical methods.
It must be understood that in the context of this thesis an ’optimal" solution 
is the mathematical solution of the problem matrix which minimizes the total 
cost. This solution will always be the most economical but may not always be 
the most useful or desirable. The logistician may need to incorporate the 




Military historians and theorists have been obsessed with the study of
strategy and tactics. The importance of logistics has not often been considered.
Few would likely admit that many wars have been won or lost because of
logistics. George C. Thorpe provided a very illuminating analogy:
Strategy is to war what the plot is to a play. Tactics is 
represented by the role of the players. Logistics furnishes 
stage management, accessories, and maintenance. The 
audience, thrilled by the action of the play and the art of the 
performers, overlooks all of the cleverly hidden details of 
stage management. ̂
The history of military logistics can be divided into three distinct periods. 
The demands for food, ammunition, and fuel have successively dominated 
logistical planning. Analysis of each period provides useful insights regarding 
the importance of modem liquid logistics.
Food and the Foot Soldier
The first period spans from the beginning of recorded history through the 
Napoleonic Wars which ended in 1815. During this time small armies relied on 
the overburdened foot soldier and pack animals for supply support. Food was 
the primary logistical necessity.
Alexander the Great was the first military commander to skillfully organize 
logistical support. His exploits began in 340 B.C.. He trained soldiers to march 
long distances under heavy weights. Only pack animals were allowed to follow
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the line of march. He allowed no wagons because the poor terrain and lack of 
roads made them a burden. Local merchants were conscripted to purchase and 
requisition supplies. He precisely coordinated land marches with the 
movement of maritime cargoes. Alexander's appreciation of logistics enabled 
him to maneuver a well trained and well fed army over great distances.®
The Roman legions followed Alexander's example. They loaded as much 
as possible on the backs of their marching infantry. In addition, they  
constructed roads which served as principal supply routes over which wagons 
and pack animals could more easily travel.^
Through the centuries that followed the collapse of the Roman empire 
logistical considerations changed very little. The development of weapons such 
as the musket only meant that cartridge pouches were added to the weight 
which soldiers bore. The soldier carried his weapon, food, and all of the 
ammunition he was likely to use in the course of battle.
Napoleon improved logistical doctrine. He was able to increase the size of 
his armies by allowing his soldiers to "live off the land".® He reduced the foot 
soldier's load by organizing foraging parties which systematically plundered 
occupied lands. Temporary depots were often established to store looted food 
and supplies.
\
Napoleon was very successful in Italy and Germany which were relatively 
rich and well cultivated. The limitations of his logistical methods caused 
setbacks for his forces in Spain from 1807 until 1812. The ultimate defeat came 
in Russia where more men died from starvation and exposure than from 
enemy fire.
The Napoleonic Wars marked the end of the logistical period dominated by 
the foot soldier and his need for food. The weight of military logistics support
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was beginning to shift from the soldier's back and would soon burden entire 
national economies.
Steam and Ammunition
The second period of logistical history lasted only from the American Civil 
War until the end of World War I. The technology introduced by the Industrial 
Revolution transformed warfare. Factories produced large quantities of 
supplies and equipment. Steam transportation, by rail and water, made it 
possible to maneuver and supply much larger armies over greater distances.^
The Civil War was marked by the development of muzzle loaded rifled 
weapons produced in large quantities. A soldier could no longer carry all of the 
ammunition he was likely to use in the course of a day's battle. Ammunition 
became the most critical supply concern.
Weapon technology continued to improve during the subsequent Franco- 
Prussian War, 1871, and Russo-Japanese War, 1905. Muzzle loaded weapons 
were replaced by breech loaded weapons. At the start of World War I, 1914, the 
machine gun had become standard equipment in all armies. The demands for 
ammunition and manpower continued to increase very rapidly during this 
period.
Despite the technological advances, armies were still dependent on pack 
animals and wagons to move their supplies from railheads to the battlefield.^ 
These huge armies still moved tactically at the pace of the foot soldier. 
However, logisticians could not forage for ammunition and weapons. Armies 
were much too large to be fed only from food found locally. The entire 
economies of industrialized nations had to be organized to support any war 
effort.^
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Internal Combustion Engine and Fuel
The final period of logistics began in the closing years of World War I and 
extends to the present. The most revolutionary changes in logistics during this 
period began with the appearance of the internal combustion e n g in e .3 This type 
of engine brought with it the tank, truck, and airplane. Very large armies 
gained increased mobility. Continuous resupply of fuel became the principle 
logistical concern.
During World War II the availability of POL was the limiting factor for
maneuvering armies. The German m ilitary commander General Heinz
Guderian called logistics the "ball and chain of armored warfare". General
%
George Patton's armored drive across Europe in 1945 was halted prematurely 
because the famous Red Ball Express was unable to provide vital POL to his 
mechanized units. He exclaimed to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, "My men 
can eat their belts, but my tanks gotta have gas!".H Over 60 per cent of all the 
supply tonnage shipped by the United States overseas during this time was in 
the form of a single petroleum product, gasoline.^
The huge resupply quantities of World War II are dwarfed by today s 
requirements. For comparison, the fuel demands of a modern division are the 
same as those of a corps, a unit three to four times its size, during World War
II. Today, fuel hungry, highly mobile, ground and air forces as well as mobile 
electric power and steam generation plants have fuel demands which can only 




Many volumes of tactical and logistical data have been published by various 
Army agencies. Despite an abundance of information, unit logisticians prepare 
fuel forecasts based exclusively on limited historical records and imprecise 
approximation methods. The reason is that the different Army agencies do not 
use common terms, each effectively speaks its own language, and provide data 
to logisticians which is not coherent.
The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent agency 
for Army tactical doctrine. TRADOC publishes FM 100-5 which defines not only 
tactics but also provides logistical equipment operating parameters for "types” 
of equipment.
The Army Logistics Center (LOGC) is responsible for publishing general 
logistics policy and guidance. No documents published by LOGC address the 
"types" of equipment used in TRADOC literature. LOGC issues SB 710-2 which 
provides data based on Equipment Category Codes (E/C).
The Department of the Army publishes FM 100-10-1 which provides 
organizational structures and identifies authorized equipment. FM 100-10-1 
does not use "types" of equipment or E/C. It relies on the equipment Line Item 
Number (LIN).
This thesis research discovered a single thread which provides coherence to 
the volumes of data. The discovery of a relationship between the Equipment
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Category Code (E/C) and the Line Item Number (LIN) was essential. Each E/C 
has a unique set of associated LIN's.
FM 101-10-1 identifies Army organizational structure and lists each 
authorized piece of equipment with its unique LIN. SB 710-2 provides fuel 
consumption data by E/C. FM 100-5 defines operating parameters for "types” of 
equipment as a function of geographical locations and levels of combat 
intensity. The "types" of equipment correspond directly to E/C. This set of 
relationships is the structure which makes the fuel demand forecasting 
problem tractable.
The POL requirem ents forecasting program exploits the discovered 
structure and coherence of the data from the three principal sources. The 
program is menu driven and oriented toward the inexperienced computer user. 
The user need only identify the unit type, geographical location, and the 
anticipated level of combat intensity.
The program provides the daily requirements for all petroleum fuels 
necessary to support Army unit personnel and equipment. The program 
description and loading instructions are presented in Appendix D. This 
forecasting program can be used for any units described in the standard Army 
Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). It considers the principal 
locations to which Army units are most likely to be deployed. Official 
unclassified Army logistics reference data and fuel consumption information 
have been incorporated into the program data base.
The FM 101-10-1 provides compiled TO&E which include the authorized 
personnel, weapons, vehicles, and equipment for every unit from division to 
company level.® The program data base includes the organizational structure, 
authorized personnel, and fuel consuming equipment for all infantry, armor,
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artillery, and combat aviation units. Many generic combat support and combat 
service units are also included. The user can also combine units or change the 
authorized equipment to customize unique organizations.
Anticipated POL consumption rates are calculated as a function of the unit 
organization, fuel consuming equipment density, geographical location, and 
expected level of combat intensity. SB 710-2 is the primary source document for 
fuel usage rates.® FM 100-5 provides the strategic and tactical doctrine 





An optimal solution to fuel transportation problems can be found when 
demands, supply, and costs can be identified. The requirements forecasting 
program provides the user with anticipated fuel demands. POL supply is a 
direct function of forecasted demands.
The supply of bulk fuel is based on forecasts of POL requirements developed 
at the consuming unit level. These POL forecasts are reviewed, consolidated, 
and forwarded up the chain of command. To ensure adequate reaction time 
each forecast covers the 72 hour period beyond the next day. For example, a 
forecast developed on the third day should project requirements for the fifth, 
sixth, and seventh days. The consuming unit's logistician is routinely informed 
in advance of the fuel quantities which will be provided during the next delivery 
period. Appendix C provides a brief description of the logistics support system  
for POL on the battlefield.
The consuming unit's logistician must also develop a cost function. The 
POL costs are most often expressed as time, volume, and/or distance variables. 
A typical cost function is gallons per day per transported mile which can be 
abbreviated as gallon-miles. The unit mission, tactical situation, and standard 
operating procedures are used to identify the coefficients for the variable 
elements of the cost function.
The "quick and dirty" transportation method is used to find an optimal 
solution for the problem matrix which minimizes the cost function. This
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optimal solution may not be the most desirable or useful solution. Utility  
t h e o r y l - ^  c a n  b e  employed to determine an optimal and most desirable solution.
The fundamental proposition of utility theory is that it is possible to obtain a 
numerical expression for any single individual's preferences. The basic 
assumption is that this individual behaves consistently in accordance with his 
or her own tastes. The unit's logistician can express the unit commander's 
POL desires or preferences by modifying the coefficients of the cost function.
Validation
A primary assertion of this thesis is that optimal solutions can be easily 
determined for a myriad of liquid logistics problems. This contention is 
validated by considering a hypothetical problem.
Appendix A presents a hypothetical military situation based on the 
deployment of an armor battalion into a hostile area. Two different solution 
techniques are demonstrated and analyzed. The first technique depicts the 
traditional solution approach which depends on limited historical data, 
imprecise approximation methods, and intuition. The second technique 
utilizes the thesis forecasting program and the "quick and dirty" transportation 
method.
During the five day scenario a fictitious battalion supply officer is confronted 
by several challenging fuel problems. He must initially forecast fuel demands 
and then anticipate potential shortages. Using the traditional approach, the 
supply officer estimates that the battalion's diesel fuel demands will be 20,900 
gallons per day. The thesis forecasting program confirms that this estimate is 
valid only for operations in the United States. The program reveals that 22,020 
gallons per day are required for combat in the Middle East.
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The battalion arrives at its destination without two of its original companies 
and is augmented with one M1A1 tank company and a rifle company. The 
mission is to defend a given area for three days. POL is available based on the 
traditional forecast of 20,900 gallons per day.
Using the traditional solution methods, the supply officer predicts that the 
augmented battalion will require more POL than the original forecast. He 
estimates that the unit will experience a daily diesel shortfall of 1,850 gallons. 
The forecasting program indicates that the unit will actually have a shortfall of 
3,815 gallons per day.
The supply officer is tasked to develop an efficient plan to transport, 
distribute, and store fuel. His plan must be modified each day in response to 
dynamic battlefield  conditions. The battalion commander wants the 
headquarters unit to receive fuel supply priority. The "quick and dirty" 
transportation method provides an optimal solution which costs 221,198 gallon- 
miles. The traditional method would cost over 370,000 gallon-miles.
The M1A1 company suffers equipment losses. The supply officer would 
intuitively assume that any losses will increase the amount of available POL. 
The thesis methods indicate that the M1A1 company could lose more than 50% 




1. The program data base should be expanded to include all Army, Air 
Force, and Marine Corps units and equipment.
2. The program structure should be modified to calculate ammunition, 
food, and water demands.
3. The program should be used as an exception reporting device at all 
levels of command. Consuming unit fuel requests could be verified by 
comparison to the program results. Many unit problems caused by 
otherwise unknown conditions, such as poor equipment maintenance 
or fuel waste, may be detected.
4. The program should be modified for use as a real time data base for 
reporting unit supply and repair parts status.
5. The optimization techniques should be employed at all operational levels 
to evaluate the constrained resource problems. The methods can be 
used to verify or redefine periodic procurement, m aintenance, 




This thesis identifies the resource allocation problems associated with 
providing petroleum fuels to Army units. It demonstrates that the optimal 
solutions to a myriad of POL transportation, distribution, and storage problems 
can be readily determined by very practical methods.
This research reveals that a simple relationship exists between Equipment 
Category Codes and Line Item Numbers. The discovery of this relationship 
affords both structure and coherence to large volumes of tactical and logistical 
data. A computer program is presented which uses this data to develop POL 
demand forecasts.
This thesis also provides the means to evaluate the constrained fuel 
resource problem once POL demands are available. The method presented can 
be used as a decision making tool to reduce costs and conserve valuable 
resources.
Comparing the solution results presented in Appendix A reveals that this 
thesis POL forecasting program combined with the "quick and dirty" method 
provides the following advantages over the traditional solution methods.
1. The unit commander's ability to make strategic and tactical decisions is 
enhanced.
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2. POL transportation, storage, and distribution problems are made 
tractable and optimal solutions can be found using a practical iterative 
method.
3. Fuel costs can be significantly reduced and lives may be saved. The 
optimum solution minimizes the total transportation requirements, 
resulting in reduced exposure of vulnerable fuel supplies.
4. The unit fuel demand forecasts are consistent and verifiable.
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The 1st Tank Battalion is ordered to prepare for immediate deployment from 
its base in Kentucky to protect our national interests in the Middle East. The 
battalion is equipped with the M60A3 main battle tank. The supply officer is 
directed to prepare a fuel request for the initial 72 hours of deployment.
He quickly reviews the actual POL usage report files for the last two years of 
combat training. He discovers that the largest daily amount of fuel consumed 
during training was 19,000 gallons of diesel and 600 gallons of motor gasoline 
(MOGAS). He decides to use 110 percent of these amounts as the basis for his 
forecast. A request is therefore prepared for 62,700 gallons of diesel fuel and 
1,980 gallons of MOGAS.
The battalion arrives at its destination one day later minus the personnel 
and equipment of two tank companies. The unit is augmented with an M1A1 
tank company and an infantry rifle company equipped with the Bradley 
Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
The mission is to defend a given area. The level of combat intensity is 
expected to be moderate. The requested fuel is stored in equal amounts at two 
separate locations. No additional fuel will be supplied for the next three days. 
The distances between the company areas of operation and storage sites are 




Site 1 Site 2
Headquarters Company 5 9
Company A (M60A3) 18 10
Company B (M60A3) 20 12
Company C (M1A1 ) 15 24
Company D (BFV) 21 17
Issues
1. Is sufficient diesel fuel available to perform the three day mission? If 
not, what is the likely shortfall?
2 . On the first day the commander wants headquarters company to have 
supply priority. How should the diesel fuel be allocated? Which 
companies should absorb any shortfall?
3. The M1A1 tank company loses 20 per cent of its main battle tanks on the 
first day. How should the diesel fuel be allocated for the second and 
third days?
4. The commander directs that remaining diesel fuel should be 
consolidated and issued from a single site. Which site should be 




The supply officer would not have historical fuel usage data for the rifle and 
M l tank companies and he would have to estimate their fuel requirements. An 
M l tank generally requires twice as much fuel as an M60A3 but since two 
M60A3 tank companies did not deploy with the battalion the supply officer 
would deduce there is sufficient fuel for all tanks. He would predict a shortfall 
due to the rifle company BFV fuel demands only.
The BFV replaces the older M l 13 and generally requires 50 per cent more 
fuel. The rifle company has thirteen BFVs and one M l 13. The 1st Battalion 
also has an M l 13 assigned. The logistician might review his unit historical 
records and discover that the M l 13 requires an average of 90 gallons per day. 
He would estimate the shortfall at 1,850 gallons per day.
Issue 2
Fuel site 1 is closest to the headquarters company area of operation. The 
supply officer would likely direct that its fuel demands be satisfied exclusively 
from site 1. He would also impose supply constraints on all other companies, 
such as restricting vehicle use to only mission essential activities. He would 
closely monitor consumption by the four line companies. They would equally 
share the burden of any shortfall.
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Issue 3
The supply officer would not be able to immediately determine the impact of 
losing three M1A1 tanks but would assume that this loss will increase the 
amount of available POL.
Issue 4
Site 1 is closest to both the M l and headquarters companies. These two units 
have the largest fuel demands. The fuel distribution elements are part of the 
headquarters company. The supply officer might intuitively decide to 
consolidate all fuel at site 1 .
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Forecasting Program with Quick and Dirty Method
Issue 1
The forecasting program confirms that the original fuel estimate of 19,000 
gallons per day is reasonable for battalion operations in Kentucky. The original 
fuel request was for 20,900 gallons per day. However, the program also reveals 
that 22 ,020  gallons per day is required for moderate intensity combat in the 
Middle East. If the battalion had deployed with all of its original companies, it 
would have experienced an initial shortfall of 1120 gallons per day.
The program calculates the augmented battalion daily fuel requirement as 
24,715 gallons. The total shortfall will be approximately 3,815 gallons per day.
Iaan.e.,.2
The Quick & Dirty Transportation Method used to address this issue is 
presented in Appendix B. The unit fuel demands are calculated by the 
forecasting program. The cost function is assumed to be the distance between 
the unit areas of operation and the fuel sites multiplied by the gallons of fuel 
transported.
The optimal solution includes satisfying all of the headquarters company's 
fuel demands. The M1A1 company absorbs the entire shortfall. Total cost is 
221,198 gallon- miles. Table A-2 shows an initial solution by the Northwest 
corner method. The first iteration is provided in Table A-3. The optimal 
solution was determined after six iterations and is presented in Table A-4.
The unit commander may want to distribute the shortfall equally among the 
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accommodate this desire. He might use coefficients to make the distances equal 
for all of the companies required to share the shortfall. He could then iterate a 
new solution which would be both optimal and desirable.
The optimal solution is the most economical and the most secure method of 
distribution. Cost is directly proportional to liability because the assumed cost 
function represents the miles which each gallon of fuel must be transported. 
Increasing the miles that POL is transported also increases the risk of accident 
or destruction by hostile forces.
Issue. 3
The POL forecasting program indicates that the M1A 1 company fuel 
demands will reduce by 1,757 gallons per day. This reduction does not change 
the optimal solution because it is less than the shortfall of 3,815 gallons per day. 
The optimal solution remains the same except the shortfall is now 2,058 gallons 
and the M1A1 fuel demand is reduced.
The logistician does not need to determine a new optimal solution until the 
change in fuel demand exceeds the shortfall. The POL forecasting program 
indicates that the M1A1 company could lose more than 50% of its tanks without 
changing this optimum solution.
Issue.4
The optimal solution matrices for fuel consolidation at sites 1 and 2 are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6 . If fuel consolidation must occur and cost is the 
only evaluation factor, then site 1 should be selected because its total cost of 
268,898 gallon-miles is less than consolidation at site 2.
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If site 1 is selected, the rifle company would receive only 20 gallons of fuel per 
day. This alternative may be tactically acceptable because the rifle company 
might be able to perform its mission as dismounted infantry.
If consolidation is not required, the most economical choice is to maintain 
both fuel sites which, as shown in Table A-4, costs only 221,198 gallon-miles.
Appendix B
QUICK & DIRTY TRANSPORTATION METHOD
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Pxocedms
M supply points supply N demand points with a certain product. Supply 
point i produces aj units and demand point j requires bj units. Suppose that the 
cost of shipping one unit from supply point i to demand point j is qj. Let xy be 
the amount sent from supply point i to demand point j. We now wish to find the 
shipping pattern that minimizes total cost.
Destinations











Demand bn a.=b.i j
1. Find a solution by the Northwest comer method.
2 . Find that row or column with the largest number of non- zero xy's and 
set the corresponding u{ or vj = 0 .
3. Compute the other û ’s or vj’s so that for each position qj = uj + vj.
4. Compute the ry = qj - (uj + vj) for all positions where xy = 0 .
5. Find the most negative ry. If all ry are positive or zero, 
then GOTO step 8 .
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6 . For the position with the most negative rjj, determine the closed circuit 
that will maintain a supply and demand balance.
7. For those positions in the closed circuit that must be decreased find the 
sm allest xjj. Subtract this amount from every place on the closed
circuit that must be decreased and add this amount to every place on
the closed circuit that must be increased. GOTO step 2 .
8 . The present set of xjj's is optimum. Compute the total minimum cost 
which is the summation of cy * xjj.
Example
Given two supply points and three demand points. Each supply point has 75 
units and each demand point requires 50 units. The costs of shipping from the 
first supply point to each of the demand points in ascending order are 2, 3, and 6 
dollars per unit. The comparable costs from the second supply point are 1 , 4, 
and 5 dollars per unit. Find the optimum shipping pattern.
1 . To find a solution by the Northwest comer method the problem data must be 
placed in a matrix. Starting in the Northwest comer of the matrix, compare 
demand to available supply.
a. If demand > supply, then satisfy the demand, subtract this amount 
from the available supply, and move one column to the right.
b. If demand < or = supply, then place the available supply in this square,
subtract this amount from the demand, and move down one row.
c. Repeat steps 1. a and b until all demands have been satisfied.
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The solution matrix by the Northwest comer method is:















Demand 50 50 50 150
2 . Set u i equal to zero.
3. Compute the other ui's and vj's:
V1 ~ C11 _U1 = 2 - 0 = 2
v2 = c12 -u i  = 3 - 0 = 3 
u2 = c22 -V2 = 4 - 3 = 1 
V3 = C23- U2 = 5 -1  = 4
4. Compute ry = cy - (û  + vj) where xy = 0: 
r21 = C21  -  (u2 + v i )  = 1 - (1 + 2) = -2
r13 = c i3 - (ui + V3) = 6 - (0 + 4) = +2
5. The most negative ry is r2 i-
6 . The closed circuit is:















Demand 50 50 50 150
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7. The smallest xjj is 25. The resulting matrix is:















Demand 50 50 50 150
GOTO step 2 .
2. Set u i equal to zero.
3. Compute the other uj's and vj's:
V1 ~ C11 "U1 = 2 - 0 = 2 
V2 = clg- Uj = 3 -0  = 3
u2 = c12 “ V1 = 1 - 2 =-1 
v3= C23 -U2 = 5 + 1 = 6
4. Compute rjj = qj - (uj + vj) where xjj = 0 :
r22  = c22 * (u2 + v2> = 4 - (-1+ 3) = +2 
r13 = CJ3 - (u i + vg) = 6 - (0 + 4) = +2
5. There is no negative rjj. GOTO step 8 .
8 . This set of xjj's is optimum.





Logistics Support System Operations
The following discussion addresses operations of the logistics system at 
division level and below. The interface with the corps system, the next higher 
echelon, is described only to show how it supports division logistic operations.
The support areas which group personnel, vehicles and equipment 
assembled to provide logistic support to a unit are called "trains”. Normally, 
the term is not used above brigade level. At company level, trains include a 
small stock of POL necessary to support very short term operations. Company 
trains can be employed in one of two ways: either as one entity, in which case 
they are termed "unit trains"; or in echelon, with the more urgently needed 
elem ents well forward, "combat trains", and the not so urgently needed 
elements located farther in the rear, "field trains". The actual position!s) 
selected for trains is dependent on tactical considerations.
The battalion trains are the connecting link between the company trains and 
the units in the brigade support area. The battalion trains provide POL support 
to the companies. This is the lowest level at which the program can be used for 
distribution planning. It is assumed that POL requirements generated by the 
program will be provided by the battalion to its parent brigade or division. Like 
the company trains, the battalion trains can operate from one or two locations.
The brigade provides POL support with units located in its "trains" area, 
which is more commonly called the brigade support area. Divisional brigades 
have no organic combat support structure. The units in the brigade support 
area providing POL support are those elements of the division which are tasked 
to support the brigade. The thesis program allows the user to allocate units
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from division assets to support each brigade using the equipment/vehicle data 
base and to obtain optimal solutions for resulting transportation problems. The 
user may also use the program at brigade level when the unit is an independent 
brigade which has an organic combat support structure.
The division support area is located in the division rear and will be 
positioned near both airlanding facilities and along the main supply route from 
corps. The corps provides POL support to the divisions and its is assumed that 







The user must load LOTUS 1-2-3 according to the instruction in the LOTUS 
user's manual. The file directory must be the same as the disk drive in which 
the program diskette has been inserted. The user must load the file named 
POL.WK2".
Initiating the Forecasting Program
Loading the POL.WK2 file initiates the program. The user will view a series 
of screens. Each screen contains a menu and prompting instructions.
The first screen will provide the user with the option to view or get a printout 
of the information produced by the program. The user selects an output option 
by typing either 1 or 2 and pressing ENTER.
The second screen prompts the user to identify the units by type and 
quantity. The Standard Requirement Codes (SRCs) for all units in the program 
data base are listed in Appendix E. The user identifies units by typing the 
appropriate SRCs.
The third screen allows the user to select a geographic profile by entering 
the number corresponding to the desired geographical location. A geographic 
profile consists of operating conditions for each equipment category. At this 
point, the user has entered all of the required data and the program begins to 
compute fuel requirements.
The program calculates the 24 hour fuel requirements for each equipment 
line item number by multiplying the equipment density, operating conditions
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profile, and fuel consumption rate. It then summarizes the forecasted POL 
consumption by fuel type for each SRC and the total force.
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UNITS IN THE PROGRAM DATA BASE
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Units in Database Files
SRC Unit Type
77000LOOO LT INF DIV
8700CJ450 ARMOR DIV, 6 M60, 4 M113
87000J460 MX DIV, 5 M60/wMl 13
57000LOOO ABN DIV (AOE)
67000L100 AIR ASLT DIV
87000J480 MX DIV, 5-M1/BFVS
01385J410 ATK HEL BN, AH1
05147J400 ENG CO, ENG BN, HVY DIV
06365J410 FA BN, 155 SP, HVY DIV
07245J410 MECH INF BN, BFVS
07245J420 MECH INF BN, M l 13
07246J410 HHC, MECH INF BN, BFVS
07246J420 HHC, MECH INF BN, M113
07247J410 RFL CO, MECH INF BN, BFVS
07247J420 RFL CO, MECH INF BN, M113
07248J400 ANTI-ARMOR CO, INF BN
17235J410 TANK BN, M60
11038J500 FWD COMM CO
17235J420 TANK BN, M l
17236J410 HHC, TANK BN, M60
17236J420 HHC, TANK BN, Ml
17237J410 TANK CO, M60
17237J420 TANK CO, Ml
19217J400 MP CO, HVY DIV
63005J410 FWD SPT BN, HVY DIV
87042J410 HHC, BDE, ARMOR DIV
87042J420 BDE HHC, INF MX DIV
06300J410 DIVARTY, ARMD DIV
44167LOOO ADA BTRY, GUN SP, STINGER
05157LOOO ENG CO, ENG BN, LT INF DIV
06705LOOO FA BN, 105MM TOW, AIR ASLT
O7Q55L0OO INF BN, AIR ASLT
08437LOOO MED CO, HVY SEP BDE (HSB)
17187LOOO CAV TRP, LT INF DIV
34144L000 MI CO (CEWI), HVY SEP BDE
42084LOOO S&T CO, SPT BN, SEP HVY BDE
43079L000 ORD CO (MAINT), HVY SPT BN
63086LOOO HHC, SPT BN, HVY SEP BDE
87102L100 HHC, HVY SEP BDE, ARMOR
06367J410 FA BTRY, 155SP, HVY DIV
07000D600 MTZ DIV
06365J420 FA BN, 155 SP, HVY DIV
06365J430 FA BN, 155 SP, HVY DIV
06398J200 FA BTRY, MLRS
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SRC Unit Type
06398J400 FA BTRY, MLRS
06445J420 FA BN, 8 " SP (3X8), AOE
06455H300 FA BN, 155 SP
03117D500 CHEM CO, INF DIV (INT)
01285D600 CS AVN BN, INF DIV (INTERIM) 
05255D600 ENG BN, INF DIV (INTERIM)
06100D600 DIV ARTY, INF DIV (INTERIM)
07004D600 HHC, INF DIV (INTERIM)
07042D600 HHC, MTZ BDE, INF DIV (INT)
07065D600 INF BN, LT ATK (I-FAV), INF DIV
07065D610 INF BN, LT ATK (HMMWV), INF DIV
07095D610 CA BN, HVY, INF DIV (INTERIM) 
07095D620 CA BN LT, INF DIV (INTERIM)
11035D600 SIG BN, INF DIV (INTERIM)
17201D600 CBT BDE AIR ASLT, INF DIV (INTERIM) 
17385D600 ATK HEL BN, INF DIV (INT)
19417D600 MP CO, MTZ DIV
34295D600 MI BN, INF DIV (INTERIM)
44155D600 AD BN (SHORAD), INF DIV (INT)
63011D600 DIV SPT CMD, INF DIV (INT)
8700GJ430 ARMD DIV, 6-MI, 4-BFVS, 2 -AHB
87000L200 MECH DIV, 5-M60, 5-M113, 2-AHB
44166L000 HHB, ADA BN, HVY DIV
44165LOOO ADA BN, HVY DIV
01400L500 CBT AVN BDE, CORPS
06100L000 DIVARTY, LT INF DIV
06525J300 FA BN, MLRS
17485L200 ARMD CAV SQDN, ACR (1X8)
87000J440 MX DIV, 5-MI, 5-BFV’S, 2-AHB
06300J420 DIVARTY, HVY DIV
1720U420 CAV BDE, AIR ATK (AH-64)
6300U420 SPT CMD, HVY DIV
01257J420 CBT SPT AVN CO, CBT BDE AIR ASLT
01287J400 GEN SPT AVN CO, CBT BDE AIR ASLT
01385J420 ATK HEL BN, AH-64, CBT BDE AIR ASLT 
03387J400 CHEMICAL CO, HVY DIV
05145J410 ENG BN, HVY DIV (RIB)
06302J400 HHB, DIVARTY, HVY DIV
06307J400 TGT ACQ BTRY, DIVARTY, HVY DIV
11035J500 SIGNAL BN, HVY DIV
17202J400 HHT, CBT BDE AIR ASLT
17205J410 CAV SQDN, AH-1, CBT BDE AIR ASLT
34285J400 MI BN (CEWI)
55427J410 AVN MAINT CO (AVIM), HVY DIV
63002J400 HHC/wMMC, SPT CMD, HVY DIV
63005J420 FSB, 2X2, HVY DIV
63005J430 FSB, 1X2, HVY DIV
63135J400 MAIN SPT BN, HVY DIV
87004J420 HHC, MECH INF DIV
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SRC„ . Unit Tvpe
05074J200 ENG CO, MDM GIRDER BRIDGE
11067L000 AREA SIG CO, MSE
05148J410 BRIDGE CO, RIBBON
06425L200 FA BN, 155 TOWED (3X8)
44347J400 ADA BTRY, CHAPARRAL SP
44445L100 ADA BN, CHAPARRAL, CORPS
05058H400 ENG CBT SPT EQUIP CO
87004L200 HHC, MECH INF DIV
19333LOOO MP CO, HVY DIV
11035LOOO SIGNAL BN, HVY DIV
11036L000 HHC, SIGNAL BN, HVY DIV
11037L000 CMD OPS CO
11038LOOO FWD COMM CO
11039LOOO AREA SIG CO
O5146L0OO HHC, ENG BN, HVY DIV
05147L000 ENG CO, HVY DIV
0514SLOOO RIBBON BRIDGE CO
34285LOOO MI BN (CEWI)
34286LOOO HQ, HQ & SVC CO, MI BN
87000J470 ARMOR DIV, 6-MI, 4-BFVs, 1-AHB
34288L000 INTEL & SURVL CO
34289LOOO EW CO
87042L100 HHC, BDE, ARMOR
87042L200 HHC, BDE, MECH INF
17375L000 TANK BN, M60
17376LOOO HHC, TANK BN, M60
17377LOOO TANK CO, TANK BN, M60
07245L000 MECH INF BN, M113
07246L000 HHC, MECH INF BN, M l 13
07247LOOO RFL CO, MECH BN, M113
07248LOOO ANTI-ARMOR CO, ITV
06300L200 DIVARTY, HVY DIV
06302LOOO HHB BTRY, DIVARTY, HVY DIV
O63O3L0OO TGT ACQ BTRY, HVY DIV
06398L000 FA BTRY, MLRS, HVY DIV
06365L100 FA BN, 155 SP (3X8), HVY DIV
06365L200 FA BN, 155 SP (3X8), HVY DIV
06365L300 FA BN, 155 SP (3X8), HVY DIV
01300L100 CBT AVN BDE, 2 AHB, AH-1
O13O2L0OO HHC, CBT AVN BDE
01303L100 CBT AVN CO, UH-1
013O4L00O CMD AVN CO
01385L100 ATK HEL BN, AH-1
17385L100 CAV SQDN, M113
63000L200 SPT CMD, HVY DIV
63OO2L0OO HHC/wMMC, SPT CMD, HVY DIV
01933L100 AVN MAINT CO (AVIM), 2 AHB, AH-1, HVY DIV
63005L100 FWD SPT BN, 2X1, HVY DIV
63005L200 FWD SPT BN, 2X2, HVY DIV
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SRC Unit Type
63005L300 FWD SPT BN, 1X2 , HVY DIV
63135LOOO MAIN SPT BN, HVY DIV
87004J410 HHC, ARMD DIV
1720U430 CAV BDE, AIR ATK, AH-1 (AOE)
01257J410 CBT SPT AVN CO
6300U430 SPT CMD, 6X4X1, HVY DIV
1720U440 CAV BDE, AIR ATK (CBAA)
6300U440 SPT CMD, 6X4X1, HVY DIV
55427J430 AVN MAINT CO, SPT CMD, HVY DIV 
57004L000 HHC, ABN DIV (AOE)
19313L000 MP CO, ABN DIV
11215L000 SIG BN, ABN DIV
11216L000 HHC, SIG BN, ABN DIV
11217L000 CMD COMM CO, SIG BN, ABN DIV
11218L000 FWD COMM CO, SIG BN, ABN DIV
44136LOOO HHB, ADA BN, ABN DIV
44137L000 ADA BTRY, VULCAN/STINGER, ABN DIV
05G25L000 ENG BN, ABN DIV
05G26LOOO HHC, ENG BN, ABN DIV
O5O27L0OO ENG CO, ENG BN, ABN DIV
O3O57L00O CHEM CO, ABN/AIR ASLT DIV
34265L000 MI BN (CEWI), ABN DIV
34266LOOO HQ, HQ & OP CO, MI BN, ABN DIV
34267LOOO C&J CO, MI BN, ABN DIV
34268LOOO INTEL & SURVL CO, MI BN
34269LOOO SVC SPT CO, MI BN, ABN DIV
57042LOOO HHC, BDE, ABN DIV
07Q35LOOO INF BN, ABN DIV
07036L000 HHC, INF BN, ABN DIV
07037L000 RFL CO, INF BN, ABN DIV
O7O38L0OO ANTI-ARMOR CO, INF BN, ABN DIV
062001X00 DIVARTY, ABN DIV
06202L000 HHB, DIVARTY, ABN DIV
06205LOOO FA BN, 105 TOWED, ABN DIV
01070L200 CBT AVN BDE, ABN DIV
01072L200 HHC, AVN BDE, ABN DIV
01375L200 ATK HEL BN, AH-64
01277LOOO ASLT HEL CO, UH-60
01075L000 AIR CAV SQDN, AH-1
63O51L0OO DISCOM, ABN DIV
63052LOOO HHC/wMMC, SPT CMD, ABN DIV
G8065L000 MED BN, SPT CMD, ABN DIV
42055LOOO S&T BN, SPT CMD, ABN DIV
43055LOOO MAINT BN, SPT CMD, ABN DIV
01973L200 AVN MAINT CO (AVIM), ABN DIV
67004LOOO HHC, AIR ASLT DIV
19343LOOO MP CO, AIR ASLT DIV
11205LOOO SIGNAL BN, AIR ASLT DIV
11206LOOO HHC, SIG BN, AIR ASLT DIV
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SEC  Unit Type------
11207LOOO CMD COMM CO, AIR ASLT DIV
11208LOOO SIG SPT CO, AIR ASLT DIV
44145LOOO ADA BN, AIR ASSLT DIV
44146L000 HHB, ADA BN, AIR ASLT DIV 
44147LOOO ADA BTRY, AIR ASLT DIV
05215L000 ENG BN, AIR ASLT DIV
05216LOOO HHC, ENG BN, AIR ASLT DIV 
34275L000 MI BN, AIR ASLT DIV
34277L000 C&J CO, MI BN, AIR ASLT DIV
34278LOOO INTEL & SURVL CO, MI BN
34279L000 SVC SPT CO, MI BN
67042LOOO HHC, BDE, AIR ASLT DIV
06702LOOO HHB, DIVARTY, AIR ASLT DIV 
O12O0L0OO CBT AVN BDE, AIR ASLT DIV 
01202L000 HHC, CBT AVN BDE,
01205L000 CBT AVN BN, UH-60
01245L100 CBT AVN BN, CH-47
01215LOOO CMD AVN BN, AIR ASLT DIV
01265L100 AIR RCON SQDN, AIR ASLT DIV
01266L100 HHT, AIR CAV SQDN
01267L100 AIR CAV TRP, AH-1
63041LOOO DISCOM, AIR ASLT DIV
77OO4L0OO HHC, LT INF DIV
19323LOOO MP CO, LT INF DIV
11045LOOO SIGNAL BATTALION
11046LOOO HHC, SIG BN, LT INF DIV
11047LOOO CMD COMM CO
11048L000 SIG SPT CO
44115L000 AIR DEFENSE BN
44116L000 HHB, ADA BN, LT INF DIV
44117L000 ADA BTRY, VULCAN/STINGER, LT INF DIV
D5155LOOO ENG BATTALION
05156L000 HHC, ENG BN, LT INF DIV
77042LOOO HHC, BDE, LT INF DIV
07016L000 HHC, INF BN, LT INF DIV
07017L000 RFL CO, INF BN, LT INF DIV
OllOOLOOO CBT AVN BDE, LT INF DIV
OHG2LOOO HHC, CBT AVN BDE, LT INF DIV
171S5L000 RECON SQDN, LT INF DIV
63G21L000 DISCOM, LT INF DIV
63G22LOOO HHC, SPT CMD, LT INF DIV
08045L000 MED BN, LT INF DIV
42Q25L000 S&T BN, LT INF DIV
43045LOOO MAINT BN, LT INF DIV
01977LOOO AVN MAINT CO (AVIM), LT INF DIV
44325H000 ADA BN, AIM DIVISION
01385L200 ATK HEL BN (AH-64)
34285J500 MI BN, HVY DIV
55427J440 TAMC SPT CMD, HVY DIV
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Appendix F 
PROGRAM DISKETTE
